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Survival Tips for Freshmen

Topic I: Answering the examinations techniques

1. Questions requiring the application of law

Sample problem
W and H got married in 1998. H, a construction engineer, is not usually around their home due to the nature of his work. One night, H, to his surprise, found out that her wife is having sexual intercourse with another woman, L, who was the long time lesbian partner of W even before their marriage.
A case was filed by H against W and L for adultery in the court of Mandaluyong. If you were the judge, how would decide the case?

Suggested answering method:
1. IRAC Method
2. Paragraph style

IRAC Method

IRAC method is the most effective answering technique during exams. IRAC is an acronym for ISSUE, REASON, ANALYSIS and CONCLUSION.

In answering this type of question, make an assertion on the ISSUE involved. Do not make a lengthy introduction of your answers. Write directly your answer, either you will dismiss the case or you will decide against the defendant (as per our given example). Professors are not fond of reading lengthy personal opinion. What they want to know is your knowledge in law.

Your assertion should be backed up with REASON. A mere assertion does not merit any point. Your answer should have a legal basis, a law, jurisprudence, well settled principle, rules and regulations etc. A mere assertion without legal basis is equivalent to personal opinion which do not merit any point. Again, the exam is principally made to determine you knowledge of law.

IN ANALYSIS, the examinee should show why such law is applicable in the given case. This part explains why you answer in the affirmative or negative, as the case may be, based on the factual setting of the problem and why your legal basis is applicable. This part should show that your assertion is correct.

CONCLUSION is the product of your analysis. This part provides the result of your analysis of factual and legal issues. Basically, it is a reiteration of your answer.

Suggested answer using IRAC method:

Issue: If I were the judge, I will dismiss the case.

Reason: The Revised Penal Code states that adultery is a “crime committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing her to be married xxxx”.

Analysis: In the given facts, W, although unfaithful to her husband, did not commit adultery for the reason that she did not had sexual intercourse with another man, but to another woman. L, being a lesbian, is not also guilty of adultery because she is not a man within the context of law.

Conclusion: In view of the above discussion, W and L did not violate the law, hence, they should not be held guilty.
Paragraph style

This style of answering method is a common style in Q&A of the UP Law Center. The principle is almost the same with the IRAC method but usually written in a single paragraph. It usually starts with an answer of “Yes or No,” unless the question requires a different answer. After the assertion, it is followed up with arguments on why such assertion is correct. The legal basis in a given factual settings are discussed simultaneously. Conclusion is generally omitted.


Suggested answering using Paragraph style:

If I were the judge, I will decide against W and L. The law provides that adultery is a “crime committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing her to be married xxxx” The law does not distinguish whether a “man other than her husband” is limited to a man (gender) and not equally applicable to woman. By limiting the applicability of the said provision to man and not to woman is tantamount in giving distinction of the law in which the law itself does not intend to distinguish. If the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish, hence, it should be made equally applicable to man and woman.

Take note that a single question may have two different answers. It is upon the examinee to persuade that his contention is correct and not the other way around.

Note: Some questions require an application of exception to the general law. Be sure to state the general law before citing the exception in the general law.


2. Questions requiring differentiation

Sample problem
1. Distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita.

Suggested answering format:
1. Paragraph format; and
2. Enumeration format.


Paragraph format

Paragraph format best suits this type of question. Be sure to make at least three enumerations but not more than five. Giving more than five distinctions will consume more time giving you less time to answer other questions, unless you are instructed by your professor to do so. Conversely, enumerating less than three will make a scant answer. Do not define the concepts or things to be differentiated. This type of questions calls for distinguishing the difference of two things in same aspect. Avoid defining the terms to be distinguished.

Suggested answer

In mala in se, the prohibited act is evil in nature, while in mala prohibita, the act is not evil per se but made illegal to regulate conduct of individual. Intent is necessary to prove before an accused can be convicted of a crime mala inse, on the other hand, intent is not necessary to convict an accused of a crime mala prohibita. Lastly, the penalty for mala in se is provided by the Revised Penal Code while the penalty in mala prohibita is provided by the law which makes the act illegal.


Enumeration format

This format makes a clearer distinction of the things to be distinguished. This may serve alternative format if there are series of numbers requiring differentiation. Make sure not to distinguish the items side by side; it is considered as marking in the bar examination.

Suggested answer

The difference between mala in se and mala prohibita are the following:

1. In mala in se, the prohibited act evil in nature while in mala prohibita, the act is not evil per se but made illegal to regulate conduct of individual;

2. Intent is necessary to prove before an accused can be convicted of a crime mala in se, on the other hand, intent is not necessary to convict an accused of a crime mala prohibita; and

3. Lastly, the penalty for mala in se is provided by the Revised Penal Code while the penalty in mala prohibita is provided by the law which makes the act illegal.


3. Questions requiring a definition

This type of question requires MEMORIZATION. The same is true in enumeration of terms. The best way to define a term is the definition made by the law itself. Memorize codal provisions which define a certain term. For example, the term obligation is define by the New Civil Code as juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

Our jurisprudence (decisions written by the Supreme Court) is also rich in definition of terms such as the term social justice as pronounced in Calalang vs. Williams. If possible, cite the case where you had adopted such definition. The works of legal scholars such as Manresa, Sanchez Roman and others also provides a rich source of definition of terms. Lastly, if you had not memorized any of these, define the term according to your understanding. Just make sure to check your grammar.

In defining terms, do not use the same words to be defined, e.g., Redeemable stocks – Stocks that may be redeemed. You are begging the question. Less word makes fewer mistakes. Your personal opinion serves no merit in examinations.


Topic 3: Basic guidelines during examinations

Try to follow these basic guidelines before and during the examinations:

1. Keep your test booklet neat and free from markings;
2. Observe proper margin; 1.5. inches in the left and 1 inch in the right;
3. Leave one line before the start of a new paragraph;
4. Use the right side of the test booklet only. Do not right at the back of your paper;
5. READ ALL THE QUESTIONS BEFORE ANSWERING THE EXAMINATION;
6. Answer all easy questions first before the difficult questions;
7. Appreciate the facts;
8. AVOID ALL CAPS handwriting. Cursive handwriting is preferable;
9. Utilize extra time to review your answers; and
10. Limit the answers to one page per question.


Digesting Cases

Case digest is basically a summary of FACTS, ISSUES and RULINGS of a certain case. A case digest should not be more than one yellow page long. In digesting a case, be sure to pick out the ultimate facts, those that are relevant to the issue to be discussed. Discard all other unnecessary details.

A case may have more than one issue; it may deal with remedial law, criminal law or political law simultaneously. Just pick the issue relevant to the subject. If your subject is criminal law I, then focus on the criminal law aspect.

Rulings refer to the decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court commonly explains and resolved the conflicts between the party litigants and explains the reason and intention of the law. These decisions refer to case laws or jurisprudence. The decision of the Supreme Court is binding to all lower court under the principle of stare decisis.

Lastly, case pooling serves the purpose if the professor assigned many case for a certain topic. Assigning cases to your classmate and working together will surely help you better understand the cases.


Sample digest

Aznar vs. Garcia
GR. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

Facts:

The deceased is a citizen of California domiciled in the Philippines. He left a will to his heirs Maria Helen Garcia and Lucy Christensen in which majority of the share was given to the latter. Helen file an opposition to the partition of the property contending that that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, in which it provides legitime for acknowledge illegitimate child. The other party contended that the law of California should prevail since the decease is a citizen of California, in which does not provide legitime for illegitimate children.

Issue: Which law on succession should apply in the given case, the Philippine law or the Californian law?

Ruling: The Philippine law should be applied. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the with respect to the intestate succession, the national law of the decedent will apply.

The conflict of laws rule in California refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent.


Note: Somebody might ask you; Llb means “Legum Baccalaureus.”

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Jurisprudence
From the Latin term juris prudentia, which means "the study, knowledge, or science of law"; it is more broadly associated with the philosophy of law or case law. These are cases decided by the Supreme Court.
Schools of Jurisprudence
1. It analyze, explain, classify, and criticize entire bodies of law, ranging from contract to tort to constitutional law (Tañada vs. Tuvera).
2. It compares and contrasts law with other fields of knowledge such as literature, economics, religion, and the social sciences (Ebralinag vs. Div. Supt. of Cebu).
3. It raises fundamental questions about the law itself. These questions seek to reveal the historical, moral, and cultural underpinnings of a particular legal concept (David vs. Arroyo, PP 1017).
4. It dictates the applicability of law (Salvacion vs. DBP, CBC 960, exemption from garnishment).
The Need to Digest
1. Practice handwriting.
2. Better comprehension of lessons.
3. Faster memorization of lesion.
4. For recitation purposes.
5. Accumulating reviewer.
Anatomy of Jurisprudence
1. Case Title
2. Annotation/Date
3. Ponente
4. Quick looks
5. Narration of facts
6. Statement of issues
7. Rulings
8. Decision and names of justices
9. Separate Opinions – concurring opinions or dissenting opinions
10. Footnotes
How to Digest
1. Facts
2. Issues
3. Ruling
Activity
Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (GRN 11263, November 2, 1916), topic: support of wife outside conjugal abode.



ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant and appellee, [GRN 11263, November 2, 1916.]

1. MARRIAGE; NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION. - Marriage is something more than a contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by agreement, and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be faithful to assist, support, and live with each other.

2. HUSBAND AND WFE; ACTION FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE.-The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, way maintain action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same.

3. ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.-The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Ostrand, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Edwardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sam, Opisso & Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested.

It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
x x x x x x x x x
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.

Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at this time.

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The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.

Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above described.
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring:
I based my vote in this case upon the ground that a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his duties thereunder. In law and for all purposes within its purview, the wife still remains an inmate of the conjugal domicile; for I regard it as a principle of law universally recognized that where a person by his wrongful and illegal acts creates a condition which under ordinary circumstances would produce the loss of rights or status pertaining to another, the law will, whenever necessary to protect fully the rights or status of the person affected by such acts, regard the condition by such acts created as not existing and will recur to and act upon the original situation of the parties to determine their relative rights or the status of the person adversely affected.
I do not believe, therefore, that the case is properly conceived by defendant, when the consideration thereof proceeds solely on the theory that the wife is outside the domicile fixed by the husband. Under the facts alleged in the complainant the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile.














GOITIA vs. CAMPOS RUEDA
[GRN 11263, November 2, 1916.]
Facts:

The Eloisa Goitia (petitioner) and Jose Campos Rueda (respondent) were legally married on January 7, 1915. After one month of living together, the petitioner left their conjugal abode and takes refuge to her parent’s home due to repeated demand that she performs unchaste and lascivious act in the respondent’s genital and maltreated of her husband. The petitioner files an action for support. The respondent, citing Spain jurisprudence, contended that he is not obliged to give support to his wife until there is a decree of separation and he is held guilty thereof and the wife has legal duty to live with him, therefore, it cannot be held that his wife has need of support from him so that she may live apart from him without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be.

Issue: May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, be compelled to pay the pension? Is his contention correct?
Ruling: The husband may be compelled to pay support in this case. The power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.
A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.