Post by pinkalou on May 3, 2006 12:53:12 GMT 7
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATION 2000
I
a) As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB for the corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing Surety Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay the loan, and the bank obtained a judgment against it and Victorino, jointly and severally. To enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the conjugal partnership of Victorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement executed by the husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the husband alone is chargeable against the conjugal partnership only when it was contracted for the benefit of the family. When the obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was to guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the obligation is presumed for the benefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety agreement to be chargeable against the partnership it must be proven that the family was benefited and that the benefit was a direct result of such agreement. (Ayala Investment v. Ching, 286 SCRA 272)
b) On April 15, 1980, Rene and Angelina were married to each other without a marriage settlement. In 1985, they acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June 1, 1990, when Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said lot to Marcelo. Is the sale void or voidable? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990, the Family Code is the law applicable. Under Article 124 of the FC, the sale of a conjugal property by a spouse without the consent of the other is void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively but only if such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got married in 1980, the law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code. Under the NCC, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v. Aldon, 100 SCRA 628 and reiterated in Heirs of Ayuste v. Malabonga, G.R. No. 118784, 2 September 1999, the sale executed by the husband without the consent of the wife is voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested right on the voidable nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence, Article 124 of the Family Code which makes the sale void does not apply.
II
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-President, and Susan, an entertainer, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to marry each other. Since Tony’s salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped working and merely “kept house”. During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and Susan decided to separate.
a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during the cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
III
a) Manuel, a Filipino, and his American wife Eleanor, executed a Joint Will in Boston, Massachusetts when they were residing is said city. The law of Massachusetts allows the execution of joint wills. Shortly thereafter, Eleanor died. Can the said Will be probated in the Philippines for the settlement of her estate? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines insofar as the estate of Eleanor is concerned. While the Civil Code prohibits the execution of joint wills here and abroad, such prohibition applies only to Filipinos. Hence, the joint will which is valid where executed is valid in the Philippines but only with respect to Eleanor. Under Article 819, it is void with respect to Manuel whose joint will remains void in the Philippines despite being valid where executed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The will cannot be probated in the Philippines, even though valid where executed, because it is prohibited under Article 818 of the Civil Code and declared void under Article 819. The prohibition should apply even to the American wife because the joint will is offensive to public policy. Moreover, it is a single juridical act which cannot be valid as to one testator and void as to the other.
b) Cristy and her late husband Luis had two children, Rose and Patrick. One summer, he mother-in-law, aged 70, took the two children, then aged 10 and 12, with her on a boat trip to Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the three were never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her mother-in-law’s estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the three are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 of the New Civil Code, inasmuch as there is no proof as to who died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the same time and there could be no transmission of rights among them. Her children hot having inherited from their grandmother, Cristy has no right to share in her mothe-in-law’s estate. She cannot share in her own right as she is not a legal heir of her mother-in-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
IV
In his last will and testament, Lamberto 1) disinherits his daughter Wilma because “she is disrespectful towards me and raises her voice talking to me”, 2) omits entirely his spouse Elvira, 3) leaves a legacy of P100,000.00 to his mistress Rosa and P50,000.00 to his driver Ernie and 4) institutes his son Baldo as his sole heir. How will you distribute his estate of P1,000,000.00? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was ineffective because the ground relied upon by the testator does not constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. Hence, the testamentary provisions in the will shall be annulled but only to the extent that her legitime was impaired. The total omission of Elvira does not constitute preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. Only compulsory heirs in the direct line may be the subject of preterition. Not having preterited, she will be entitled only to her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy of 100,000 pesos. The legacy of 50,000 pesos in favor of Ernie is not inofficious not having exceeded the free portion. Hence, he shall be entitled to receive it. The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion, shall be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto will be distributed as follows:
Baldo -------------------------------------------------450,000
Wilma-------------------------------------------------250,000
Elvira--------------------------------------------------250,000
Ernie--------------------------------------------------- 50,000
---------------
1,000,000
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was effective because disrespect of, and raising of voice to, her father constitute maltreatment under Article 919(60) of the New Civil Code. She is, therefore, not entitled to inherit anything. Her inheritance will go to the other legal heirs. The total omission of Elvira is not preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. She will receive only her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy. Ernie will receive the legacy in his favor because it is not inofficious, The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion, will be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto shall be distributed as follows:
Heir Legitime Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo 500,000 200,000 700,000
Elvira 250,000 250,000
Ernie 50,000 50,000
------------- ------------- ------------------- ----------
TOTAL 750,000 50,000 200,000 1,000,000
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Same answer as the first Alternative Answer except as to distribution. Justice Jurado solved this problem differently. In his opinion, the legitime of the heir who was disinherited is distributed among the other compulsory heirs in proportion to their respective legitimes, while his share in the intestate portion, if any, is distributed among the other legal heirs by accretion under Article 1018 of the NCC in proportion to their respective intestate shares. In sum the distribution shall be as follows:
Heir Legitime Distribution
Of Wilma’s
Legitime Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo 250,000 125,000 200,000 575,000
Wilma (250,000)
Elvira 250,000 125,000 375,000
Ernie 50,000 50,000
----------- ---------- -------- ----------- ------------
TOTAL 500,000 250,000 50,000 200,000 1,000,000
V.
Sometime in 1990, Sarah, born a Filipino but by then a naturalized American citizen, and her American husband Tom, filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Filipina. Can the petition be granted? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If Tom and Sarah have been residing in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the effectivity of RA 8552, the petition may be granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted because the American husband is not qualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refilled upon the effectivity of RA 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. This is the law applicable, the petition being still pending with the lower court.
Under the Act, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt jointly, the Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an alien, is qualified to adopt under Section 7(b)(i) of the Act for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, Tom, an alien, is not qualified because he is neither a former Filipino citizen nor married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, their petition has to be denied. However, if they have been residents of the Philippines three years prior to the effectivity of the Act and continues to reside here until the decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt the nephew of Sarah under Section 7(b) thereof, and the petition may be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the petition was filed before the effectivity of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the Family Code is the law applicable.
Under the FC, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. Under a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, when husband and wife must adopt jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah is qualified to adopt under Article 184(3)(a) for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, Tom is not. He is not a former Filipino citizen and neither is he married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, the petition must be denied.
VI
The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands of Romulo. Federico seeks a right of way through a portion of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the market. He has chosen a point where he will pass through a housing project of Romulo. The latter wants him to pass another way which is one kilometer longer. Who should prevail? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Romulo will prevail. Under Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servant estate and where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway is the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the criterion of shortest distance. Since the route chosen by Federico will prejudice the housing project of Romulo, Romulo has the right to demand that Federico pass another way even though it will be longer.
VII
a) Arturo borrowed P500,000.00 from his father. After he had paid P300,000.00, his father died. When the administrator of his father’s estate requested payment of the balance of P200,000.00, Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his as evidenced by a notation at the back of his check payment for the P300,000 reading: “In full payment of the loan”. Will this be a valid defense in an action for collection? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation “in full payment of the loan” was written by Arturo’s father, there was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case, the notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. The condonation being implied, it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effective. The defense of full payment will, therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo himself, it merely proves his intention in making the payment but in no way does it bind his father (Yam v. CA, G.R. No. 104726, 11 February 1999). In such case, the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation may be inferred. There being no condonation at all, the defense of full payment will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the notation was written by Arturo’s father, it amounted to an express condonation of the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be valid under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the amount of the balance is more than 5,000 pesos, the acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article 748. There being no acceptance in writing by Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation to pay the balance subsists. The defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. In case the notation was not written by Arturo’s father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
b) Anastacia purchased a house and lot on installments at a housing project in Quezon City. Subsequently, she was employed in California and a year later, she executed a deed of donation, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California, donating the house and lot to her friend Amanda. The latter brought the deed of donation to the owner of the project and discovered that Anastacia left unpaid installments and real estate taxes. Amanda paid these so that the donation in her favor can be registered in the project owner’s office. Two months later, Anastacia died, leaving her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action to annul the donation on the ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation or in a separate public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous one because she had to pay unpaid installments and taxes; hence her acceptance may be implied. Who is correct? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The property donated was an immovable. For such donation to be valid, Article 749 of the New Civil Code requires both the donation and the acceptance to be in a public instrument. There being no showing that Amanda’s acceptance was made in a public instrument, the donation is void. The contention that the donation is onerous and, therefore, need not comply with Article 749 for validity is without merit. The donation is not onerous because it did not impose on Amanda the obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price or the arrears in real estate taxes. Amanda took it upon herself to pay those amounts voluntarily. For a donation to be onerous, the burden must be imposed by the donor on the donee. In the problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor on the donee. The donation not being onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article 749.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Neither Rosa nor Amanda is correct. The donation is onerous only as to the portion of the property corresponding to the value of the installments and taxes paid by Amanda. The portion in excess thereof is not onerous. The onerous portion is governed by the rules on contracts which do not require the acceptance by the donee to be in any form. The onerous part, therefore, is valid. The portion which is not onerous must comply with Article 749 of the New Civil Code which requires the donation and the acceptance thereof to be in a public instrument in order to be valid. The acceptance not being in a public instrument, the part which is not onerous is void and Rosa may recover it from Amanda.
VIII
a) Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim foreshore lands bordering them and to construct thereon adequate docking and harbor facilities. Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty Company, authorizing the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the sea bordering the city, with 30% of the land to be reclaimed to be owned by Fil-Estate as compensation for its services. The Solicitor General questioned the validity of the agreement on the ground that it will mean reclaiming land under the sea which is beyond the commerce of man. The City replies that this is authorized by R.A. 1899 because it authorizes the construction of docks and harbors. Who is correct? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land from the sea. The reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not acquire ownership over the reclaimed land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If the reclamation of the land from the sea is necessary in the construction of the docks and the harbors, the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is not. Since RA 1899 authorized the city to construct docks and harbors, all works that are necessary for such construction are deemed authorized, including the reclamation of land from the sea. The reclamation being authorized, the city is the owner of the reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as payment for the services of the contractor.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
On the assumption that the reclamation contract was entered into before RA 1899 was repealed by PD 3-A, the City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are “beyond the commerce of man” in the sense that they are not susceptible of private appropriation, ownership or alienation. The contract in question merely calls for the reclamation of 300 hectares of land within the coastal waters of the city. Per se, it does not vest, alienate or transfer ownership of land under the sea. The city merely engaged the services of Fil-Estate to reclaim the land for the city.
b) Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for the past 15 years. Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to obtain a free patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same land, on the basis of a certification by the District Forester that the same is already “alienable and disposable”. Moreover. Jorge had already registered the patent with the Register of Deeds of the province, and he was issued an Original Certificate of Title for the same. Regina filed an action for annulment of Jorge’s title on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently. Will the action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An action for the annulment of Jorge’s Original Certificate of Title will prosper on the following grounds:
(1) Under Chapter IX of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, foreshore lands are disposable for residential, commercial, industrial, or similar productive purposes, and only by lease when not needed by the government for public service.
(2) If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or aquaculture purposes, it comes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and can only be acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
(3) Free patent is a mode of concession under Section 41, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act, which is applicable only for agricultural lands.
(4) The certificate of the district forester that the land is already “alienable and disposable” simply means that the land is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the Bureau of Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent because it is already covered by a lease contract between BFAR and Regina. That contract must be respected.
(5) The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab initio, not only because the Bureau has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, but also because of the false statements made in his sworn application that he has occupied and cultivated the land since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent law. Under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, any patent, concession or title obtained thru false representation is void ab initio. In cases of this nature, it is the government that shall institute annulment proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a prayer for the reversion of the land to the state. However, Regina is a party in interest and the case will prosper because she has a lease contract for the same land with the government.
CIVIL LAW BAR EXAMINATION 2000
I
a) As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB for the corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing Surety Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay the loan, and the bank obtained a judgment against it and Victorino, jointly and severally. To enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the conjugal partnership of Victorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement executed by the husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the husband alone is chargeable against the conjugal partnership only when it was contracted for the benefit of the family. When the obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was to guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the obligation is presumed for the benefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety agreement to be chargeable against the partnership it must be proven that the family was benefited and that the benefit was a direct result of such agreement. (Ayala Investment v. Ching, 286 SCRA 272)
b) On April 15, 1980, Rene and Angelina were married to each other without a marriage settlement. In 1985, they acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June 1, 1990, when Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said lot to Marcelo. Is the sale void or voidable? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990, the Family Code is the law applicable. Under Article 124 of the FC, the sale of a conjugal property by a spouse without the consent of the other is void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively but only if such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got married in 1980, the law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code. Under the NCC, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v. Aldon, 100 SCRA 628 and reiterated in Heirs of Ayuste v. Malabonga, G.R. No. 118784, 2 September 1999, the sale executed by the husband without the consent of the wife is voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested right on the voidable nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence, Article 124 of the Family Code which makes the sale void does not apply.
II
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-President, and Susan, an entertainer, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to marry each other. Since Tony’s salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped working and merely “kept house”. During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and Susan decided to separate.
a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during the cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by then in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
III
a) Manuel, a Filipino, and his American wife Eleanor, executed a Joint Will in Boston, Massachusetts when they were residing is said city. The law of Massachusetts allows the execution of joint wills. Shortly thereafter, Eleanor died. Can the said Will be probated in the Philippines for the settlement of her estate? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines insofar as the estate of Eleanor is concerned. While the Civil Code prohibits the execution of joint wills here and abroad, such prohibition applies only to Filipinos. Hence, the joint will which is valid where executed is valid in the Philippines but only with respect to Eleanor. Under Article 819, it is void with respect to Manuel whose joint will remains void in the Philippines despite being valid where executed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The will cannot be probated in the Philippines, even though valid where executed, because it is prohibited under Article 818 of the Civil Code and declared void under Article 819. The prohibition should apply even to the American wife because the joint will is offensive to public policy. Moreover, it is a single juridical act which cannot be valid as to one testator and void as to the other.
b) Cristy and her late husband Luis had two children, Rose and Patrick. One summer, he mother-in-law, aged 70, took the two children, then aged 10 and 12, with her on a boat trip to Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the three were never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her mother-in-law’s estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the three are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 of the New Civil Code, inasmuch as there is no proof as to who died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the same time and there could be no transmission of rights among them. Her children hot having inherited from their grandmother, Cristy has no right to share in her mothe-in-law’s estate. She cannot share in her own right as she is not a legal heir of her mother-in-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
IV
In his last will and testament, Lamberto 1) disinherits his daughter Wilma because “she is disrespectful towards me and raises her voice talking to me”, 2) omits entirely his spouse Elvira, 3) leaves a legacy of P100,000.00 to his mistress Rosa and P50,000.00 to his driver Ernie and 4) institutes his son Baldo as his sole heir. How will you distribute his estate of P1,000,000.00? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was ineffective because the ground relied upon by the testator does not constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. Hence, the testamentary provisions in the will shall be annulled but only to the extent that her legitime was impaired. The total omission of Elvira does not constitute preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. Only compulsory heirs in the direct line may be the subject of preterition. Not having preterited, she will be entitled only to her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy of 100,000 pesos. The legacy of 50,000 pesos in favor of Ernie is not inofficious not having exceeded the free portion. Hence, he shall be entitled to receive it. The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion, shall be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto will be distributed as follows:
Baldo -------------------------------------------------450,000
Wilma-------------------------------------------------250,000
Elvira--------------------------------------------------250,000
Ernie--------------------------------------------------- 50,000
---------------
1,000,000
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was effective because disrespect of, and raising of voice to, her father constitute maltreatment under Article 919(60) of the New Civil Code. She is, therefore, not entitled to inherit anything. Her inheritance will go to the other legal heirs. The total omission of Elvira is not preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. She will receive only her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy. Ernie will receive the legacy in his favor because it is not inofficious, The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion, will be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto shall be distributed as follows:
Heir Legitime Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo 500,000 200,000 700,000
Elvira 250,000 250,000
Ernie 50,000 50,000
------------- ------------- ------------------- ----------
TOTAL 750,000 50,000 200,000 1,000,000
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Same answer as the first Alternative Answer except as to distribution. Justice Jurado solved this problem differently. In his opinion, the legitime of the heir who was disinherited is distributed among the other compulsory heirs in proportion to their respective legitimes, while his share in the intestate portion, if any, is distributed among the other legal heirs by accretion under Article 1018 of the NCC in proportion to their respective intestate shares. In sum the distribution shall be as follows:
Heir Legitime Distribution
Of Wilma’s
Legitime Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo 250,000 125,000 200,000 575,000
Wilma (250,000)
Elvira 250,000 125,000 375,000
Ernie 50,000 50,000
----------- ---------- -------- ----------- ------------
TOTAL 500,000 250,000 50,000 200,000 1,000,000
V.
Sometime in 1990, Sarah, born a Filipino but by then a naturalized American citizen, and her American husband Tom, filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Filipina. Can the petition be granted? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If Tom and Sarah have been residing in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the effectivity of RA 8552, the petition may be granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted because the American husband is not qualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refilled upon the effectivity of RA 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. This is the law applicable, the petition being still pending with the lower court.
Under the Act, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt jointly, the Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an alien, is qualified to adopt under Section 7(b)(i) of the Act for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, Tom, an alien, is not qualified because he is neither a former Filipino citizen nor married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, their petition has to be denied. However, if they have been residents of the Philippines three years prior to the effectivity of the Act and continues to reside here until the decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt the nephew of Sarah under Section 7(b) thereof, and the petition may be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the petition was filed before the effectivity of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the Family Code is the law applicable.
Under the FC, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. Under a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, when husband and wife must adopt jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah is qualified to adopt under Article 184(3)(a) for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, Tom is not. He is not a former Filipino citizen and neither is he married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, the petition must be denied.
VI
The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands of Romulo. Federico seeks a right of way through a portion of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the market. He has chosen a point where he will pass through a housing project of Romulo. The latter wants him to pass another way which is one kilometer longer. Who should prevail? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Romulo will prevail. Under Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servant estate and where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway is the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the criterion of shortest distance. Since the route chosen by Federico will prejudice the housing project of Romulo, Romulo has the right to demand that Federico pass another way even though it will be longer.
VII
a) Arturo borrowed P500,000.00 from his father. After he had paid P300,000.00, his father died. When the administrator of his father’s estate requested payment of the balance of P200,000.00, Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his as evidenced by a notation at the back of his check payment for the P300,000 reading: “In full payment of the loan”. Will this be a valid defense in an action for collection? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation “in full payment of the loan” was written by Arturo’s father, there was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case, the notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. The condonation being implied, it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effective. The defense of full payment will, therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo himself, it merely proves his intention in making the payment but in no way does it bind his father (Yam v. CA, G.R. No. 104726, 11 February 1999). In such case, the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation may be inferred. There being no condonation at all, the defense of full payment will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the notation was written by Arturo’s father, it amounted to an express condonation of the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be valid under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the amount of the balance is more than 5,000 pesos, the acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article 748. There being no acceptance in writing by Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation to pay the balance subsists. The defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. In case the notation was not written by Arturo’s father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
b) Anastacia purchased a house and lot on installments at a housing project in Quezon City. Subsequently, she was employed in California and a year later, she executed a deed of donation, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California, donating the house and lot to her friend Amanda. The latter brought the deed of donation to the owner of the project and discovered that Anastacia left unpaid installments and real estate taxes. Amanda paid these so that the donation in her favor can be registered in the project owner’s office. Two months later, Anastacia died, leaving her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action to annul the donation on the ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation or in a separate public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous one because she had to pay unpaid installments and taxes; hence her acceptance may be implied. Who is correct? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The property donated was an immovable. For such donation to be valid, Article 749 of the New Civil Code requires both the donation and the acceptance to be in a public instrument. There being no showing that Amanda’s acceptance was made in a public instrument, the donation is void. The contention that the donation is onerous and, therefore, need not comply with Article 749 for validity is without merit. The donation is not onerous because it did not impose on Amanda the obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price or the arrears in real estate taxes. Amanda took it upon herself to pay those amounts voluntarily. For a donation to be onerous, the burden must be imposed by the donor on the donee. In the problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor on the donee. The donation not being onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article 749.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Neither Rosa nor Amanda is correct. The donation is onerous only as to the portion of the property corresponding to the value of the installments and taxes paid by Amanda. The portion in excess thereof is not onerous. The onerous portion is governed by the rules on contracts which do not require the acceptance by the donee to be in any form. The onerous part, therefore, is valid. The portion which is not onerous must comply with Article 749 of the New Civil Code which requires the donation and the acceptance thereof to be in a public instrument in order to be valid. The acceptance not being in a public instrument, the part which is not onerous is void and Rosa may recover it from Amanda.
VIII
a) Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim foreshore lands bordering them and to construct thereon adequate docking and harbor facilities. Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty Company, authorizing the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the sea bordering the city, with 30% of the land to be reclaimed to be owned by Fil-Estate as compensation for its services. The Solicitor General questioned the validity of the agreement on the ground that it will mean reclaiming land under the sea which is beyond the commerce of man. The City replies that this is authorized by R.A. 1899 because it authorizes the construction of docks and harbors. Who is correct? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land from the sea. The reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not acquire ownership over the reclaimed land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If the reclamation of the land from the sea is necessary in the construction of the docks and the harbors, the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is not. Since RA 1899 authorized the city to construct docks and harbors, all works that are necessary for such construction are deemed authorized, including the reclamation of land from the sea. The reclamation being authorized, the city is the owner of the reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as payment for the services of the contractor.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
On the assumption that the reclamation contract was entered into before RA 1899 was repealed by PD 3-A, the City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are “beyond the commerce of man” in the sense that they are not susceptible of private appropriation, ownership or alienation. The contract in question merely calls for the reclamation of 300 hectares of land within the coastal waters of the city. Per se, it does not vest, alienate or transfer ownership of land under the sea. The city merely engaged the services of Fil-Estate to reclaim the land for the city.
b) Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for the past 15 years. Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to obtain a free patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same land, on the basis of a certification by the District Forester that the same is already “alienable and disposable”. Moreover. Jorge had already registered the patent with the Register of Deeds of the province, and he was issued an Original Certificate of Title for the same. Regina filed an action for annulment of Jorge’s title on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently. Will the action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An action for the annulment of Jorge’s Original Certificate of Title will prosper on the following grounds:
(1) Under Chapter IX of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, foreshore lands are disposable for residential, commercial, industrial, or similar productive purposes, and only by lease when not needed by the government for public service.
(2) If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or aquaculture purposes, it comes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and can only be acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
(3) Free patent is a mode of concession under Section 41, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act, which is applicable only for agricultural lands.
(4) The certificate of the district forester that the land is already “alienable and disposable” simply means that the land is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the Bureau of Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent because it is already covered by a lease contract between BFAR and Regina. That contract must be respected.
(5) The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab initio, not only because the Bureau has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, but also because of the false statements made in his sworn application that he has occupied and cultivated the land since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent law. Under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, any patent, concession or title obtained thru false representation is void ab initio. In cases of this nature, it is the government that shall institute annulment proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a prayer for the reversion of the land to the state. However, Regina is a party in interest and the case will prosper because she has a lease contract for the same land with the government.